Western New England Law Review
Volume 32 32 (2010)
Issue 1

Article 1

1-1-2010

REFLECTIONS ON THE MOVEMENT
TOWARD A MORE CHILD-CENTERED
ADOPTION
Annette R. Appell
Washington University Law School

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.wne.edu/lawreview
Recommended Citation
Annette R. Appell, REFLECTIONS ON THE MOVEMENT TOWARD A MORE CHILD-CENTERED ADOPTION, 32 W. New Eng.
L. Rev. 1 (2010), http://digitalcommons.law.wne.edu/lawreview/vol32/iss1/1

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Review & Student Publications at Digital Commons @ Western New England
University School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Western New England Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons
@ Western New England University School of Law. For more information, please contact pnewcombe@law.wne.edu.

\\server05\productn\W\WNE\32-1\WNE101.txt

unknown

Seq: 1

10-MAY-10

14:21

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW
Volume 32

2010

Number 1

ARTICLES
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CHILD-CENTERED ADOPTION
ANNETTE RUTH APPELL*
INTRODUCTION
Twenty years ago, when I began to represent foster children in
the historic Cook County Juvenile Court in Chicago, Illinois,1 I dis
covered the deep and enduring connections children have to their
kin, particularly their parents and siblings. I represented children
of parents on whom the court and agencies had given up—families
whose legal ties had been or were on the precipice of being termi
nated. In contrast to the state actors, the children remained deeply
connected to their parents, even when they were resigned to never
again live with them. There were also siblings who asked me to
fight against termination of their parents’ parental rights or to resist
their adoptions because they did not want to be separated from
each other or to have no guaranty that they could continue to know
and see each other or their parents; others resisted adoption be
cause they feared their names would change.
My colleagues and I fought on their behalf for legal protections
that would preserve their identities and bridge these connections.
* Professor of Law and Associate Dean of Clinical Affairs, Washington Univer
sity Law School.
1. Chicago’s juvenile court, founded in 1899, is credited as the first juvenile court
in America. DAVID S. TANENHAUS, JUVENILE JUSTICE IN THE MAKING, at xxv-xxvi
(2004).
1
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In other words, we fought to maintain legal, social, and family con
nections after termination of parental rights and into the adoption.2
Unfortunately, the law did not recognize these ties. Legally, the
parent-child relationship was “all or nothing” and our legal strate
gies to protect these connections were largely unsuccessful.3 These
strategies included seeking termination of parental rights orders
that incorporated post-termination and post-adoption visitation or
ders or constrained the power of the court-appointed guardian with
authority to consent to the children’s adoption. Such constraints
included authorizing the guardian to permit adoption only by per
sons willing to help the children maintain connections to their par
ents or siblings or to persons who would continue to be bound by
post-termination and adoption visitation agreements to which they
had already assented at the termination-of-parental-rights stage.4
Our social work consisted of introducing to each other preadoptive foster parents of siblings who were to be adopted into dif
ferent families.5 We made these introductions to enable the adop
tive parents to maintain sibling contact after adoption and to serve
as support for each other. Through this work, we aimed to create
extended kin networks of adults tied together through their
(adopted) children. We hoped these networks would keep children
connected across legal-family borders and develop shared knowl
edge, information, and ongoing support for the adoptive parents
and the children they adopted. We also negotiated and reduced to
writing unenforceable agreements between birth and prospective
adoptive parents for ongoing contact after adoption. While this
work did not carry the imprimatur of law, we hoped for compliance
and that the process itself would communicate the vitality of these
connections to the child welfare system and the families who would
adopt our clients.
2. E.g., In re M.M., 619 N.E.2d 702, 708 (Ill. 1993) (denying motions brought on
behalf of children seeking to enforce trial court orders conditioning adoption on the
adoptive parents’ willingness to permit post-adoption contact); In re Donte A., 631
N.E.2d 257, 257-58 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994) (refusing to limit the power of a legal guardian
by requiring that the guardian condition its consent to adoption on finding prospective
adoptive parents that would allow post-adoption sibling visitation).
3. See generally In re M.M., 619 N.E.2d 702; In re Donte A., 631 N.E.2d 257. But
see Aristotle P. v. Johnson, 721 F. Supp. 1002, 1007-10 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (finding constitu
tionally protected liberty interests in sibling visitation).
4. In re M.M., 619 N.E.2d at 708; In re Donte A., 631 N.E.2d at 257-58.
5. In those days, foster parents were not likely to know each other. Permanency
planning was solely in the domain of caseworkers who transported children from their
various homes to the state social services offices or fast food restaurants for family
visits.

\\server05\productn\W\WNE\32-1\WNE101.txt

2010]

unknown

Seq: 3

CHILD-CENTERED ADOPTION

10-MAY-10

14:21

3

At the time, there was very little literature and even less law
acknowledging or protecting these enduring connections.6 Not
even two decades had passed since the Adoption Assistance and
Child Welfare Act (“Adoption Assistance Act”) became law in
1980.7 Among other things, this act deposed the anonymous infant
adoption orthodoxy that had defined adoption for much of the cen
tury.8 In the 1980s, the adoption paradigm was still one that con
templated a clean break from the past, extinguishing all biological
family connections (except in the case of step-parent adoption) and
even changing the child’s birth certificate to reflect the adoptive
parents as the child’s birth parents.9 By designating adoption as the
privileged goal for foster children who cannot be reunited with their
families and reducing barriers to and providing financial support for
adoption, the Adoption Assistance Act challenged the notion that
older children were not adoptable.10
This challenge failed, however, to account for the fact that
these older children carried with them known pasts and conscious
relationships. Indeed, even children and adults adopted as infants
carry their pasts with them, perhaps more so because their pasts are
unknown.11 Lawmakers and social workers were slow to respond
6. In fact, the American Law Institute digest of post-adoption parent-child visita
tion cases, first composed in 1990, did not exist when I began my research. See gener
ally Danny R. Veilleux, Annotation, Postadoption Visitation by Natural Parent, 78
A.L.R.4th 218 (1990). Since 1990, the digest has filled out considerably, with the vast
majority of cases dated after 1990. See generally id. Moreover, the number of adoption
with contact statutes continues to increase. Compare Annette R. Appell, Increasing
Options to Improve Permanency: Considerations in Drafting an Adoption with Contact
Statute, CHILD. LEGAL RTS. J., Fall 1998, at 24, 36-42 (describing thirteen adoption with
contact statutes), with infra Appendix (reporting on twenty such statutes).
7. Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-272,
§§ 420-28, 470-76, 94 Stat. 500, 501-13, 516-21 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 620-28, 670-76
(2006)).
8. See Elizabeth S. Cole, Advocating for Adoption Services, in FOSTER CHILDREN
IN THE COURTS 449 (Mark Hardin ed., 1983) (describing the history of adoption and the
myths that foster care adoption undercuts). The dominance of the infant adoption par
adigm persisted even though, at the time, infant adoptions comprised a minority of
adoptions. Annette Ruth Appell, The Move Toward Legally Sanctioned Cooperative
Adoption: Can It Survive the Uniform Adoption Act?, 30 FAM. L.Q. 483, 488-89 (1996).
9. Elizabeth J. Samuels, The Idea of Adoption: An Inquiry into the History of
Adult Adoptee Access to Birth Records, 53 RUTGERS L. REV. 367, 376-83 (2001).
10. Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, §§ 420, 470.
11. PETER L. BENSON, ANU R. SHARMA & EUGENE C. ROEHLKEPARTAIN,
GROWING UP ADOPTED: A PORTRAIT OF ADOLESCENTS & THEIR FAMILIES 26 (1994)
(noting that seventy percent of adolescent girls and fifty-seven percent of adolescent
boys adopted as infants reported that they wished to meet their birth parents); see also
DAVID M. BRODZINSKY, MARSHALL D. SCHECHTER & ROBIN MARANTZ HENIG, BE
ING ADOPTED: THE LIFELONG SEARCH FOR SELF 11 (1992).
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to these contradictions. At the time the Adoption Assistance Act
became law, there was little social science research regarding the
adoption of foster children12 and scant interrogation of the closed
adoption-rebirth paradigm.13 Yet it would appear that the same
forces that were leading to more organic and inclusive notions of
adoption, including the Adoption Assistance Act, were pushing to
ward opening adoption in practice and law.
Open adoption has now become the norm in practice for all
types of adoption.14 Common law is slow to sanction open adop
tion because adoption itself is a statutory creation, the sine qua non
of which has become the complete substitution of adoptive ties for
birth ties. Most state adoption statutes continue to embody the old
12. For exceptions, see, for example, ARTHUR D. SOROSKY, ANNETTE BARAN &
REUBEN PANNOR, THE ADOPTION TRIANGLE: THE EFFECTS OF THE SEALED RECORD
ON ADOPTEES, BIRTH PARENTS, AND ADOPTIVE PARENTS (1978) (reconceptualizing
adoption as a lifelong process for birth parents, adoptees, and adoptive parents); Rob
ert Borgman, Antecedents and Consequences of Parental Rights Termination for Abused
and Neglected Children, 60 CHILD WELFARE 391 (1981) [hereinafter Borgman, Ante
cedents and Consequences] (study illustrating the children’s resistance to adoption with
out post-adoption family contact guarantees); Robert Borgman, The Consequences of
Open and Closed Adoption for Older Children, 61 CHILD WELFARE 217 (1982) [herein
after Borgman, Consequences of Open and Closed Adoption] (illustrating, inter alia,
that open adoption can help ease birth parent and foster children’s resistance to
adoption).
13. Exceptions include Katharine T. Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood as an Exclu
sive Status: The Need for Legal Alternatives When the Premise of the Nuclear Family Has
Failed, 70 VA. L. REV. 879, 880-81, 912-44 (1984) (noting the variety of parent-like
relationships adults have to children); Borgman, Consequences of Open and Closed
Adoption, supra note 12, at 218-22; Andre P. Derdeyn, Andrew R. Rogoff & Scott W.
Williams, Alternatives to Absolute Termination of Parental Rights After Long-Term Fos
ter Care, 31 VAND. L. REV. 1165, 1172 (1978) (noting, inter alia, that courts are some
times hesitant to terminate parental rights because of the affective ties between parents
and child); Marsha Garrison, Why Terminate Parental Rights?, 35 STAN. L. REV. 423,
457-74 (1983) (critiquing the exclusive parenthood model for foster children); Michael
S. Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of “Neglected” Children: Standards for Removal of
Children from Their Homes, Monitoring the Status of Children in Foster Care, and Ter
mination of Parental Rights, 28 STAN. L. REV. 623, 670-74 (1976) (noting persistence of
ties foster children feel to their parents).
14. Harold D. Grotevant et al., Many Faces of Openness in Adoption: Perspectives
of Adopted Adolescents and Their Parents, 10(3-4) ADOPTION Q. 79, 80 (2007). Adop
tion of older children, step-children, and related children, which for years predominated
adoption, were generally open in the sense that the birth relations and adoptive rela
tions were known to each other. Annette Ruth Appell, Blending Families Through
Adoption: Implications for Collaborative Adoption Law and Practice, 75 B.U. L. REV.
997, 1001-02 (1995) [hereinafter Appell, Blending Families Through Adoption]. What is
most striking is that infant adoptions are increasingly open. Mardell Groth et al., An
Agency Moves Toward Open Adoption of Infants, 66 CHILD WELFARE 247, 248 (1987);
Susan M. Henney et al., The Impact of Openness on Adoption Agency Practices: A
Longitudinal Perspective, 6(3) ADOPTION Q. 31, 34 (2003).
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norms, treating adoption as a rebirth that severs and erases all ties
and then seals all information about the birth family.15 Of course,
adoptive parents gain the rights of parenthood through adoption,
including the right to determine with whom their children will asso
ciate; grants of visitation rights over their objection or otherwise
providing legal guarantees that others can have contact with the
adoptee remains exceptional, but is on the rise.16
This Article reflects on the increasingly widespread and nor
mative movement toward the practice and regulation of honoring
children’s pre-adoptive and often ongoing relationships to birth
family members. This Article first rehearses the current state of
statutory and judicial post-adoption contact regulation, with em
phasis on adoption with contact, a regulatory scheme that best re
flects the autonomy of the new adoptive family, but nevertheless
may not protect the child’s interests when the adults cannot come
to an agreement regarding post-adoption contact. This Article then
presents a brief overview of pertinent studies of post-adoption con
tact here and in the United Kingdom, where the law permits courts
to order post-adoption contact without the agreement of the adop
tive parents. The regulation and study of open adoptive families
reveal them to be dynamic, collaborative, porous, and rich collec
tives that center around the child’s interests. The Article concludes
with some findings and recommendations from the United King
dom’s experience that are instructive for the United States.
I. THE REGULATION

OF

POST-ADOPTION CONTACT

Although open adoption encompasses a vast array of relation
ships and is largely unregulated, there are primarily two types of
regulatory schemes that sanction and enforce post-adoption contact
among birth relatives, adoptive parents, and the adoptee:
(1) those permitting courts to enforce post adoption contact
agreements among the parties, i.e., adoption with contact stat
utes; and (2) those permitting the court to impose post adoption
visitation or contact without regard to the parties’ agreement.
The major distinction between these two categories of statutes is
that adoption with contact is, by definition, based on an agree
15. See generally Naomi Cahn, Perfect Substitutes or the Real Thing?, 52 DUKE
L.J. 1077 (2003) (exploring social and legal history of adoption); Samuels, supra note 9,
at 373-86 (tracing the history of these norms).
16. See infra Part II.

R
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ment between the parties, while the second category does not
require that the parties agree.17

A. Court-Imposed Open Adoption
Court-imposed post-adoption contact is predominately statutory,18 but can be equitable.19 Court-imposed post-adoption
contact statutes empower courts to order visits at the request of
third parties, usually nonparent relatives, but also birth parents and
siblings, even when the adoptive parents object.20 This type of open
adoption can be useful, particularly when there are people impor
tant to the child, but whose importance the adoptive parents do not
appreciate; this form of open adoption also may be appropriate
when there are logistical constraints precluding agreement regard
ing contact.21
At the same time, this form of open adoption challenges the
autonomy of the adoptive parents and the new adoptive family. In
truth though, this new adoptive family is enmeshed in the child’s
birth family in and through the adoptee, who inevitably brings these
connections into the adoption. When adoptive families do not rec
ognize this phenomenon, it could be problematic for the child be
cause these connections are important to adoptees, who are likely
to revisit birth connections cyclically throughout their lives.22
Moreover, adoptive parents who do not have contact with birth
parents or relatives may be more likely to think poorly of the child’s
17. Annette R. Appell, Enforceable Post Adoption Contact Statutes, Part II:
Court-Imposed Post Adoption Contact, 4(2) ADOPTION Q. 101, 101 (2000) [hereinafter
Appell, Court-Imposed Post Adoption Contact] (citation omitted); see also Appell,
Blending Families Through Adoption, supra note 14, at 1020 (discussing cases in which
courts ordered post-adoption contact without explicit statutory authority). Massachu
setts provides both mechanisms as it has an adoption with contact statute, MASS. GEN.
LAWS ch. 210, §§ 6C, 6D, 6E (2008), and has recognized the equitable authority of the
court to order such contact without agreement of the parties. Adoption of Vito, 728
N.E.2d 292, 300 (Mass. 2000).
18. Adoption of Vito, 728 N.E.2d at 301-03; see also Annette R. Appell, CourtOrdered Third Party Visitation and Family Autonomy, 3(4) ADOPTION Q. 93, 98-101
(2000) [hereinafter Appell, Court-Ordered Third Party Visitation] (rehearsing law re
garding third party visitation).
19. See, e.g., Michaud v. Wawruck, 551 A.2d 738, 739-41 (Conn. 1988); Loveless v.
Michalak, 522 N.E.2d 873, 874-76 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988); Adoption of Vito, 728 N.E.2d at
300.
20. Appell, Court-Imposed Post Adoption Contact, supra note 17, at 101-02.
21. See infra Part I.C (discussing logistical challenges).
22. See generally BRODZINSKY, SCHECHTER & HENIG, supra note 11 (describing
how adoptees revisit their adoption and birth connections at each developmental phase
of their lives).

R

R
R

\\server05\productn\W\WNE\32-1\WNE101.txt

2010]

unknown

Seq: 7

CHILD-CENTERED ADOPTION

10-MAY-10

14:21

7

birth relations,23 perceptions that the child may absorb as negative
messages about the child’s worth or that might produce cognitive
dissonance for the child who has loyalties to the birth family.
B. Adoption with Contact Statutes
As the persistence and depth of birth connections have pushed
adoption to become more open,24 there has been an increase in the
prevalence of agreements among birth and adoptive parents for
post-adoption contact.25 In a number of states this phenomenon
raised concerns about the fairness of private ordering in these open
adoptions and whether the parties, particularly birth parents, un
derstood the nonbinding effect of the post-adoption-contact agree
ments.26 These considerations, along with a growing recognition of
the importance of birth heritage to adoptees, have led a number of
states to codify such adoptions.27 These statutes, in effect, create a
new form of adoption: one that, from the outset, acknowledges the
child’s pre-adoption birth connections and explicitly brings them
into the new adoptive family, often as part of the adoption decree
itself.28
Adoption with contact statutes share at least two principal
strengths. First, they are collaborative because they are based on
the agreement of those who will have the contact and not on a
court-imposed order. Second, their design minimizes court inter
vention during and after the adoption proceeding. For example,
most of the statutes articulate guidelines for creation, modification,
and enforcement of the agreement after adoption. Moreover, and,
perhaps most importantly, these statutes explicitly state that any vi
23. Karie M. Frasch, Devon Brooks & Richard P. Barth, Openness and Contact in
Foster Care Adoptions: An Eight-Year Follow-Up, 49 FAM. REL. 435, 441 (2000).
24. See infra notes 101-105 and accompanying text.
25. Annette R. Appell, Survey of State Utilization of Adoption with Contact, 6(4)
ADOPTION Q. 75, 79 (2003) [hereinafter Appell, Survey].
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.0427(1) (West 2005); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 127.187(2) (LexisNexis Supp. 2005); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-5-35(A) (West Supp.
2008); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 112-b(2) (McKinney Supp. 2010); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 26.33.295(2) (West Supp. 2010). Indiana law requires the agreement to be ac
knowledged by the birth and adoptive parents and be filed with the court. IND. CODE
ANN. §§ 31-19-16-2(4)(B), 31-19-16-3 (West 2008). Louisiana, Maryland, and Rhode
Island also require the agreement to be filed with the court. LA. CHILD. CODE ANN.
art. 1269.4 (Supp. 2010); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-331(c)(2) (LexisNexis 2006);
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-7-14.1(b)(3) (2003). Massachusetts requires the agreement to be
“incorporated but not merged into the adoption decree, and shall survive as an inde
pendent contract.” MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 210, § 6C(d) (2008).

R
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olation or failure of the agreement is not grounds to set aside the
adoption or parental rights relinquishment.29
A growing number of states have passed legislation that ac
knowledges, accounts for, and regulates post-adoption contact.30
California’s statute articulates the primary considerations under
girding these laws and reflects broad notions of kinship and
identity:31
The Legislature finds and declares that some adoptive chil
dren may benefit from either direct or indirect contact with birth
relatives, including the birth parent or parents or an Indian tribe,
after being adopted. Postadoption contact agreements are in
tended to ensure children of an achievable level of continuing
contact when contact is beneficial to the children and the agree
ments are voluntarily entered into by birth relatives, including
the birth parent or parents or an Indian tribe, and adoptive par
ents. Nothing in this section requires all of the listed parties to
participate in the development of a postadoption contact agree
ment in order for the agreement to be entered into.32

By the end of the last decade of the twentieth century, fifteen
states had adopted statutes that permitted birth relatives and adop
tive parents to enter into enforceable open adoption agreements.33
Currently, there are at least twenty. I highlight these statutes be
cause they protect the autonomy of adoptive parents to enter into
29. Appell, Survey, supra note 25, at 76-77.
30. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-116.01 (2007); CAL. FAM. CODE § 8616.5 (West
2004); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-715(h)-(n) (West 2004); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 63.0427 (West 2005); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 31-19-16-1 to -8 (West 2008); LA. CHILD.
CODE ANN. arts. 1269.1-.8 (Supp. 2010); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW §§ 5-308, -331,
-345, -3A-08, -3B-07 (LexisNexis 2006); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 210, §§ 6C-6E (2008);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 259.58 (West 2007); MONT. CODE ANN. § 42-5-301 (2009); NEB.
REV. STAT. §§ 43-162 to -165 (2008); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 127.187-.1895 (LexisNexis Supp. 2005); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-5-35 (West Supp. 2008); N.Y. DOM. REL.
LAW § 112-b (McKinney Supp. 2010); N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 383-c(5)(b)(ii) (McKin
ney Supp. 2010); OR. REV. STAT. § 109.305 (2007); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-7-14.1 (2003);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-6-17 (2004); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15A, § 4-112 (2002); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 26.33.295 (West Supp. 2010); W.V. CODE ANN. § 48-22-704(e) (Lex
isNexis 2004); see also infra Appendix.
31. See Appell, Survey, supra note 25, at 79 (reporting that concern for the child’s
interest in open adoption was a primary motivation behind enacting the adoption with
contact statutes).
32. CAL. FAM. CODE § 8616.5(a).
33. Annette R. Appell, Enforceable Post-Adoption Contact Statutes, Part I: Adop
tion with Contact, 4(1) ADOPTION Q. 81, 82 (2000). Many state legislatures enacted
grandparent visitation statutes, many of which apply after adoption, but those arose out
of a different movement and most frequently apply in related adoptions. Appell,
Court-Ordered Third Party Visitation, supra note 18, at 99.
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an adoption on their own terms and internalize the type of collabo
ration that is necessary to make the contact successful. This is not
to say that the court-ordered post-adoption contact model does not
have value or that blended families cannot come to terms with
these imposed conditions,34 but the agreement of the parties models
a more private and organic family operation and is more consistent
with U.S. norms of family autonomy.
These adoptions with contact statutes make clear that when
open adoptions are entered into under such a statute, parties have
rights and obligations.35 Those open adoption agreements entered
into outside these mechanisms continue to be unregulated. Major
factors motivating states to adopt such regulations were the desira
bility of providing procedures for these arrangements, the wisdom
of clarifying when these arrangements are extralegal and when they
are subject to enforcement,36 and, of course, the growing under
standing of children’s interest in openness.37 This codification, also
known as cooperative adoption, models and accommodates family
privacy and the existential facts of adoption: that the birth family
and adoptive family are tied together through the child and that
adopted children are “forever members of two families—the one
that gave them life and the one that nurtured them through the
process of adoption.”38
These adoption with contact statutes, informed as much by the
political process as academic research, apply only to some adop
tions and to some family members and not others. For example,
some statutes limit cooperative adoption to parents who have con
sented to the adoption and preclude parents whose parental rights
were involuntarily terminated.39 Such statutes are inconsistent with
34. See, e.g., CAROLE SMITH & JANETTE LOGAN, AFTER ADOPTION: DIRECT
CONTACT AND RELATIONSHIPS 44-50 (2004); Janette Logan & Carole Smith, Face-toFace Contact Post Adoption: Views from the Triangles, 35 BRIT. J. SOC. WORK 3, 16-17
(2005); Elsbeth Neil, Contact After Adoption: The Role of Agencies in Making and Sup
porting Plans, 26 ADOPTION & FOSTERING 25, 25 (2002); Carole Smith, Trust v. Law:
Promoting and Safeguarding Post-Adoption Contact, 27 J. SOC. WELFARE & FAM. L.
315, 315-16 (2005).
35. Appell, Blending Families Through Adoption, supra note 14, at 1003-08.
36. Appell, Survey, supra note 25, at 76-79.
37. Id. at 79.
38. Kenneth W. Watson, The Case for Open Adoption, PUB. WELFARE, Fall 1988,
at 24, 24.
39. See, e,g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-715(h)-(n) (West 2004); IND. CODE
ANN. §§ 31-19-16-1 to -8 (West 2008); MONT. CODE ANN. § 42-5-301 (2009); N.Y. DOM.
REL. LAW § 112-b (McKinney Supp. 2010); N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 383-c(5)(b)(ii) (McKinney Supp. 2010); see also infra Appendix.
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research that suggests parents who contested the termination and
adoption can be successful participants in post-adoption contact.40
Moreover, children’s attachments to parents are not necessarily de
pendent on the way parental rights were terminated.41 A number
of statutes confine the persons who can enter into enforceable post
adoption-contact agreements to parents or relatives to whom chil
dren have a substantial relationship,42 even though research sug
gests that a number of relatives (especially grandparents) can be
important participants in post-adoption contact and that many in
fant adoptions involve ongoing contact with them.43
In addition, although the statutes are commendable for their
respect for the adoptive kin network’s autonomy, most do not pro
vide for counseling or other mechanisms to help the participants
understand their rights and responsibilities, the value and purpose
of adoption with contact, or the special challenges of blending mul
tiple families.44 In the end, though, these statutes signify an impor
tant message about the value and existence of adoptive kin
networks, the endurance of biological kinship, and the status of
post-adoption-contact agreements entered into pursuant to these
statutes and those entered into without legal sanction.45
In contrast to court-imposed open adoption, the adoption with
contact statutes have produced remarkably little litigation.46 Most
litigation that has occurred addresses whether open adoption agree
ments not entered into under the statute are enforceable under the

40. See infra text accompanying notes 99-130 (rehearsing studies regarding courtordered and consensual post-adoption contact).
41. See Borgman, Antecedents and Consequences, supra note 12, at 396-98 (study
indicating that children were most attached to their parents after contested termination
of parental rights proceedings, but that when parents and case workers helped them
accept the adoption, they remained connected to their parents).
42. See infra Appendix.
43. See infra Parts II.D-E.
44. A number of statutes do provide dispute resolution mechanisms if a dispute
regarding the agreement arises later. See infra Appendix.
45. See, e.g., In re M.M., 589 N.E.2d 687, 690-92 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992); Weinschel v.
Strople, 466 A.2d 1301, 1306 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1983); Fast v. Moore, 135 P.3d 387,
388 (Or. Ct. App. 2006); see also infra Appendix.
46. Appell, Survey, supra note 25, at 75-76. Massachusetts presents a possible
exception, but much of the litigation in that state preceded the Massachusetts adoption
with contact statute, MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 210, § 6C (2008), and appears to revolve
around disputes regarding court-imposed contact, a form of open adoption that does
not fall under the adoption with contact rubric. See infra notes 54-59, 77-94 and accompanying text.
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statute.47 In one of the rare cases involving litigation on the merits
of a statutory adoption with contact agreement, the Minnesota Su
preme Court held that the contact agreement created a contractual
right that the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause pro
tected.48 This interest afforded the birth father, who had filed suit
to enforce the agreement, a right to an evidentiary hearing, includ
ing the right to confront witnesses in the enforcement action.49
This case is significant, not just because of its rarity, but for its
articulation of the nature and extent of the contact agreement. The
decision defined the nature of the birth parent’s rights under the
agreement to be contractual, rather than parental, underscoring the
important legal fact that the rights the birth parent gains through
adoption with contact are not parental rights. At the same time, the
court’s application of the Mathews v. Eldridge 50 test regarding what
process was due the father took very seriously his interest and the
risk of erroneous deprivation. Thus, the court required an actual
hearing regarding the propriety of terminating contact,51 determin
ing that the father’s interest outweighed the burden on the state to
afford a full hearing.52 Finally, clarifying the burden of proof in an
enforcement action, a subject on which the statute was silent, the
47. E.g., In re M.B., 921 N.E.2d 494, 499-501 (Ind. 2009) (holding that an agree
ment that purported to be a precondition to termination of parental rights and adoption
violated the statute but was nevertheless enforceable); Adoption of Edgar, 853 N.E.2d
1068, 1075 (Mass. App. Ct. 2006) (statute does not apply to court-sanctioned open
adoptions not entered into by agreement of the parties); Moore, 135 P.3d at 388 (post
adoption-contact agreement entered into after the adoption was not enforceable under
the statute); In re Tara P., 836 A.2d 219, 222 (R.I. 2003) (the court was not required to
enter open-adoption decree that did not meet the statutory requirement when the fif
teen-year-old adoptee did not agree and the mother and adoptive parent, the grand
mother, did not jointly negotiate an agreement for post-adoption); see also In re
Kimberly S., 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 740, 744 (Ct. App. 1999) (parent not entitled to notice of
post-adoption contact option); In re Zachery D., 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 407, 410 (Ct. App.
1999) (same). But see C.O. v. Doe, 757 N.W.2d 343, 345 (Minn. 2008) (action brought
to enforce a 2005 adoption contact agreement).
48. C.O., 757 N.W.2d at 349 (holding that the birth father had a property interest
in the contractual right established pursuant to the statute). In In re M.B., the Indiana
Supreme Court held that the mother had a statutory right to notice and an opportunity
to be heard before a court could terminate her post-adoption visitation with her chil
dren. In re M.B., 921 N.E.2d at 501.
49. In C.O., there was no hearing and much of the evidence on which the trial
court relied was out-of-court statements by the birth father’s ex-girlfriend. C.O., 757
N.W.2d at 350-51.
50. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976).
51. C.O., 757 N.W.2d at 350-51. The court did not, however, require a height
ened standard of proof, holding that in the absence of statutory guidance, the standard
would be a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 353.
52. Id. at 351-52.
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court held that the burden was on the party seeking “to benefit
from a statutory provision”—here, the adoptive parents who were
seeking to establish that exceptional circumstances existed to termi
nate the agreement.53
Massachusetts appears to have the most reported postadoption contact litigation of all of the states, the vast majority of
which does not appear to have arisen under the adoption with con
tact statute, probably as a result of Massachusetts’ relatively longstanding and robust practice of court-ordered post-adoption and
post-termination family contact.54 In fact, so rooted is this practice
that the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, in Adoption of
Vito, explicitly rejected the argument that statutory amendments
providing for adoption with contact and post-termination contact
agreements removed the judiciary’s equitable authority to impose
post-termination and post-adoption contact.55 It is not surprising,
then, that there continues to be litigation regarding the court’s dis
cretion to order post-adoption contact, which is limited only by the
best interests of the child standard, a notoriously indefinite
measure.56
In fact, the Vito court recognized this danger of increased liti
gation, as well as the risks of incursion into the adoptive parents’
parental rights, when courts order post-adoption contact without
the adoptive parents’ agreement.57 Even so, Vito affirmed the con
tinued authority of courts to impose post-adoption contact when
best for the child—just one year after enactment of the adoption
with contact statute.58 At that time, the courts appeared to equate
best interests in the context of post-adoption contact with displayed
bonding between the birthparent and the child.59 This equitable
53. Id. at 352-53.
54. Infra text accompanying notes 77-94.
55. Adoption of Vito, 728 N.E.2d 292, 300-04 (Mass. 2000).
56. See Adoption of Lars, 702 N.E.2d 1187, 1192 (Mass. App. Ct. 1998) (noting
“the breadth of the judge’s discretion with respect to selection of adoption plans and
the recognition of postadoption visitation by the biological parents as an element to be
considered in an evaluation of a child’s best interests”); see also Annette R. Appell &
Bruce A. Boyer, Parental Rights vs. Best Interests of the Child: A False Dichotomy in the
Context of Adoption, 2 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 63, 74-82 (1995).
57. Adoption of Vito, 728 N.E.2d at 304.
58. See An Act Relative to Adoption and Promoting the Welfare of Children, ch.
3, § 17, 1999 Mass Acts 2, 10-14 (codified at MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 210, § 3(d) (2008)).
59. E.g., Adoption of Greta, 729 N.E.2d 273, 281 (Mass. 2000); Adoption of Vito,
728 N.E.2d at 303. The Supreme Judicial Court recently, in dicta, noted that the “con
siderations beyond bonding may be relevant” to the child’s interests in post-adoption
contact, such that post-adoption contact may be in the interests even of children with
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power may provide important safeguards for children, but it also
may undermine the autonomy of the new blended families that
adoption creates.
C. Statutory Post-Termination-of-Parental-Rights Contact
Provisions
Most of the adoption with contact statutes contemplate an
agreement between the birth parents or other birth relatives and
the adoptive parents that would be entered into at the time of adop
tion. However, it is not uncommon, particularly in foster care
cases, for the termination proceeding and the adoption proceeding
to be separated in time, place, and constituents.60 Indeed, at the
time of the termination of parental rights, there may not be a desig
nated adoptive family.61 This discontinuity creates gaps between
the time of, and personnel involved in, the creation of the agree
ment and the adoption. Moreover, not all children whose parental
rights are terminated will be adopted,62 but they will still have ties
to siblings or other relatives. Massachusetts63 and Florida64 are
among the few states with statutes that address the lacuna between
termination of parental rights and adoption, a stage that, unfortu
nately, could last for a lifetime.65 Nevada provides various mecha
nisms to bridge the gap between termination of parental rights and
out exhibited ties to their parents. Adoption of Rico, 905 N.E.2d 552, 559 (Mass. 2009);
see also infra text accompanying notes 83-94.
60. See, e.g., In re M.M., 619 N.E.2d 702, 706-07 (Ill. 1993); In re Donte A., 631
N.E.2d 257, 258 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994). Both M.M. and Donte A. involved children seek
ing to compel their state guardian to permit adoption only by persons who would agree
to post-adoption contact with birth siblings (and parents as well in M.M.’s case); in
those cases, termination of parental rights—which authorized the guardian to consent
to adoption—occurred in a separate court and proceeding and at a different time.
61. E.g., Adoption of Rico, 905 N.E.2d at 553 (at time of termination, there was
no identified adoptive family).
62. See Martin Guggenheim, The Effects of Recent Trends to Accelerate the Termi
nation of Parental Rights of Children in Foster Care—An Empirical Analysis in Two
States, 29 FAM. L.Q. 121, 140 (1995) (estimating based on disparities between numbers
of termination of parental rights cases and adoptions in Michigan and New York “that
there are somewhere between 40,000 and 80,000 children who have been freed for
adoption but have not yet been adopted nationwide”).
63. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 210, § 3(d). Nevada addresses this gap for purposes of
ensuring that the adoptive parents carry the post-adoption agreement into the adoption
proceedings. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 41.509, 127.1875, 127.188 (LexisNexis 2004 &
Supp. 2005).
64. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.811(7) (West Supp. 2010).
65. See Guggenheim, supra note 62, at 140 (“Modern reforms aimed at helping
families in need have resulted in creating the highest number of unnatural orphans in
the history of the United States.”).
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adoption with contact.66 These include requiring the adoptive par
ents, their attorneys, and the agencies to notify the court regarding
the contact agreement,67 requiring the adoption court to inquire of
the adoptive parents as to whether there is a contact agreement in
place,68 and permitting the birth parents to bring a civil damages
action when the adoptive parents have concealed the existence of
an agreement before the adoption court.69
Florida’s statute permits the court that terminates parental
rights to order “communication” or “contact” between the child
and “parents, siblings, or relatives of the parent whose rights are
terminated” when in the best interests of the child.70 “[T]he nature
and frequency of the communication or contact must be set forth in
written order and may be reviewed upon motion of any party,” in
cluding “an identified prospective adoptive parent.”71 The statute
further requires the court to review the “nature and frequency of
the communication or contact” once the child is placed for
adoption.72
The Massachusetts provision, added in 1999 to the termination
of parental rights statute,73 explicitly reserves the right of the birth
parent and the person petitioning to terminate parental rights to
enter into “an agreement for post-termination contact or communi
cation.”74 The statute also grants jurisdiction to the termination
court to resolve disputes relating to the agreement.75 The agree
ment itself becomes “null and void” once an adoption or guardian
ship decree is entered, but does not “prohibit a birth parent who
has entered into a post-termination agreement from entering into
an agreement for post-adoption contact or communication pursuant
to section 6C once an adoptive family has been identified.”76
Even before Massachusetts added the explicit provisions for
post-termination contact in 1999, its courts were considering post
66. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 41.509, 127.1875, 127.188.
67. Id. § 127.1875.
68. Id. § 127.188.
69. Id. § 41.509.
70. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.811(7)(b) (West Supp. 2010).
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. An Act Relative to Adoption and Promoting the Welfare of Children, ch. 3,
§ 17, 1999 Mass Acts 2, 10-14 (codified at MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 210, § 3(d) (2008)).
74. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 210, § 3(d).
75. Id.
76. Id.
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termination and post-adoption parental visitation.77 They did so
based on equitable principles:
Given the “broad, equitable powers” of courts in this area, we
see no reason why a judge dealing with a petition to dispense
with parental consent may not evaluate “the plan proposed by
the department” in relation to all the elements the judge finds
are in the child’s best interests, including parental visitation.78

This is a longstanding and oft-used power of the Massachusetts
termination of parental rights and adoption courts.79 In Adoption
of Lars, a Massachusetts appellate court upheld termination of pa
rental rights orders that mandated any subsequent adoption decree
to include a birthparent-child visitation order.80 Although this case
predated the 1999 adoption with contact provisions,81 the court an
ticipated (and assumed) the inevitability of adoptive parent agree
ment to post-adoption contact when it upheld the visitation order
against the child welfare agency’s objection:
Here, where the children had not yet been placed in a prospec
tive adoptive home as of the time of trial, visitation has not been
judicially thrust upon identified adoptive parents. When such
prospective parents have been chosen, they will, by their willing
ness to adopt, have implicitly, if not expressly, consented to the
visits ordered by the judge.82

Even after the 1999 addition of the Massachusetts statutory
adoption with contact and enforceable post-termination of parental
rights visitation provisions, courts continued to order post-termina
tion visits based on judicial equitable authority. For example,
Adoption of Terrence considered whether it was in the best interests
77. E.g., In re Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 467 N.E.2d 861, 866 (Mass. 1984).
78. Id. (citations omitted); see also Adoption of Vito, 728 N.E.2d 292, 299 (Mass.
2000) (noting equitable authority and citing long line of cases acknowledging this
authority).
79. See Adoption of Vito, 728 N.E.2d at 299 (citing nine cases in which such or
ders had been entered since 1984).
80. Adoption of Lars, 702 N.E.2d 1187, 1191-92 (Mass. App. Ct. 1998).
81. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 210, § 3(d). The statute provides,
(d) Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit the petitioner and a
birth parent from entering into an agreement for post-termination contact or
communication. The court issuing the termination decree under this section
shall have jurisdiction to resolve matters concerning the agreement. Such
agreement shall become null and void upon the entry of an adoption or guard
ianship decree.
Id.
82. Adoption of Lars, 702 N.E.2d at 1191.
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of Terrence to order minimal visits with his cognitively limited,
mentally ill mother after termination even though there had been
no statutory agreement for such visits and, apparently, without the
court knowing what the child’s actual adoption plan was.83
This resistance to the legislative adoption and termination with
contact provisions surfaced most recently regarding the pseudony
mously named Rico and his father.84 Rico, then a twelve-year-old
raised in foster care since the age of three, and his father shared a
mutual bond and desire to see each other but, for some reason
could not be reunited.85 The court terminated Rico’s parents’ pa
rental rights after a thirteen-day trial in 2006 when Rico was nine.86
At the same time, the court found that Rico’s best interests lay in
ongoing contact with his father and siblings after termination of pa
rental rights and adoption, but the court made no order to that ef
fect.87 Instead, the court made the gratuitous finding that Rico’s
legal custodian, the child-welfare agency, had the discretion to af
ford visitation.88
The court’s failure to act affirmatively to protect these relation
ships was odd, particularly when Massachusetts law provides both
equitable and statutory options to protect what was by all accounts
a strong and mutual connection between father and son. The court
could have exercised its equitable power to affirmatively order con
tact, as the Supreme Judicial Court held on appeal was the trial
judge’s duty upon making a finding that the contact was in the
child’s best interests.89 Or, the court could have directed the appar
ently willing agency and father to “enter[ ] into an agreement for
post-termination contact or communication” under General Laws
of Massachusetts chapter 210 section 3(d).90 Yet the trial court left
what was clearly an important issue up to the discretion of an
agency that had failed for nine years to find permanency for Rico
(albeit at the time of the termination, it had failed for only six
years).
The Supreme Judicial Court, however, only recognized the eq
uitable method for effecting ongoing contact between Rico and his
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Adoption of Terrence, 787 N.E.2d 572, 578-79 (Mass. App. Ct. 2003).
Adoption of Rico, 905 N.E.2d 552 (Mass. 2009).
Id. at 553-55.
Id. at 553.
Id.
Id. at 554-55.
Id. at 560.
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 210, § 3(d) (2008).
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family when it held that “the judge was obligated to enter” an order
for “postadoption visitation or contact between Rico and his father,
as well as among Rico and his siblings.”91 Although it is very likely
that Rico will and should have contact with his father and siblings
after adoption and that the family that adopts Rico should be open
and willing to foster such a relationship,92 the court did not seem to
consider the termination with contact method. Perhaps the court
felt strongly that post-adoption contact would have to be ordered if
and when an adoptive family came forward to adopt Rico or, à la
the appeals court’s reasoning in Adoption of Lars,93 that any family
adopting Rico would be willing to allow his father and siblings into
their extended kin network.
In any event, the courts reviewing Rico’s case on appeal
glossed over the statutory mechanism for agreeable visitation or
ders.94 It seems that the long-recognized equitable authority for
courts to order such contact has eclipsed the termination and adop
tion with contact provision the legislature added in 1999. Neverthe
less, one of the lessons of open adoption, and particularly adoption
with contact, is that often the child’s families—birth, foster, and
adoptive—are in the optimal position to determine what is best for
the child and the birth and adoptive families, including what types
of arrangements will meet the needs of the families and the child.
In contrast, courts and governmental agencies struggle under heavy
caseloads and an unavoidable distance between bureaucratic func
tioning and the lived lives of children and families. Rico could have
provided the opportunity to place the plans for a child in the hands
of the people closest to him. Confronted with a child-welfare fail
ure—a child in foster care for three-quarters of his life without re
turning home or receiving an adoptive family—perhaps the
reviewing courts had had enough, but they also may have missed an
opportunity in the process.
II. THE FAMILIES

OF

OPEN ADOPTION

Despite the ongoing legal paradigm of the discrete nuclear
family, social science recognizes that families are both fluid in for
mation and porous in boundaries.95 This is particularly true of
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
FAMILY

Adoption of Rico, 905 N.E.2d at 560.
Perhaps this was shorthand for what the Lars court articulated.
Adoption of Lars, 702 N.E.2d 1187, 1191 (Mass. App. Ct. 1998).
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 210, § 6C.
See generally JUDITH STACEY, IN THE NAME OF THE FAMILY: RETHINKING
VALUES IN THE POSTMODERN AGE (1996) (describing postmodern families);
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adoptive families. There do not appear to be any social science
studies of the families who participate in legally regulated open
adoption (adoption with contact or court-ordered post-adoption
contact) in the United States. There have been, however, a number
of studies of unregulated open adoption here96 and of courtimposed post-adoption contact in England,97 where the Children’s
Act 1989 permits courts to order post-adoption contact without the
express agreement of the adoptive parents.98
These studies reveal a complex, fraught, and overall positive
set of relationships and family formations. The studies portray ex
tended, dynamic kin networks that are inorganically created but
evolve into multifocal extended families that are sometimes com
fortable and sometimes uncomfortable, sometimes bitter and other
times sweet. These studies are also beginning to suggest lessons for
social workers, lawyers, and courts regarding how to assist in the
creation and maintenance of these families. The following is a brief
survey of the highlights of findings from studies here and abroad
that might help illustrate how these new blended families of open
adoption function.

Annette R. Appell, The Endurance of Biological Connection: Heteronormativity, SameSex Parenting and the Lessons of Adoption, 22 BYU J. PUB. L. 289 (2008) [hereinafter
Appell, The Endurance of Biological Connection] (discussing the construction of kin
ship networks around biological and social relationships in families where both birth
parents do not live with the child).
96. E.g., Jerica M. Berge et al., Adolescents’ Feelings About Openness in Adop
tion: Implications for Adoption Agencies, 85 CHILD WELFARE 1011, 1017 (2006)
(describing Grotevant-McRoy’s large, longitudinal Minnesota-Texas Adoption Re
search Project); Marianne Berry, The Practice of Open Adoption: Findings from a Study
of 1396 Adoptive Families, 13 CHILD. & YOUTH SERV. REV. 379 (1991) (reporting on
one phase of large longitudinal study); Marianne Berry et al., The Role of Open Adop
tion in the Adjustment of Adopted Children and Their Families, 20 CHILD. & YOUTH
SERV. REV. 151 (1998) (four-year study of over 700 adoptions by nonfoster parents);
Nora Dunbar et al., Processes Linked to Contact Changes in Adoptive Kinship Net
works, 45 FAM. PROCESS 449 (2006) (part of Grotevant-McRoy longitudinal study of
infant open adoptions); Xiaojia Ge et al., Bridging the Divide: Openness in Adoption
and Postadoption Psychosocial Adjustment Among Birth and Adoptive Parents, 22 J.
FAM. PSYCHOL. 529 (2008) (presenting data from the Early Growth and Development
Study, which examined the correlation between the degree of openness and post-adop
tion adjustment for birth and adoptive parents).
97. Murray Ryburn, A Study of Post-Adoption Contact in Compulsory Adoptions,
26 BRIT. J. SOC. WORK 627, 639 (1996); Lois Wright et al., Adolescent Adoption and the
Birthfamily, 1 J. PUB. CHILD WELFARE 35 (2007); see also SMITH & LOGAN, supra note
34, at 53-69.
98. 1989, c. 41, §§ 8-11 (Eng.).
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A. The Contact
In the studies reported here, contact was ongoing after adop
tion through voluntary arrangements or by court order. In these
ongoing contact studies, the contact ranged from exchange of let
ters and phone calls to in-person visits, attendance at important
rites of passage, overnight visits, and an enlargement of the kinship
network.99 Moreover, in families with more than one adoptee, the
range of contact might vary among children, and the families
tended to view as optimal the most open of the relationships.100 It
is not uncommon for members of the extended birth family to be
part of the contact.101 In fact, the definition of birth family tends to
be child-centered and might include adopted or at-home siblings,
stepparents, foster siblings and other fictive kin, aunts, uncles, and
grandparents.102 Where openness decreased, other members of the
birth family might step into the contact.103
The amount and type of contact both reflects and shapes the
perspectives and relationships among the adults such that more
open contact led to more positive adoptive-parent perceptions of
the birth relatives. For example, the “adoptive parents with closed
adoptions were significantly more likely to have a negative or
mostly negative view of the biological parent than adoptive parents
with open adoptions.”104 In contrast, the greatest percentage of
parents with positive views of the birth parents were those who had
in-person contact.105
In one study of foster-child adoptions, children placed in the
first month of life were most likely to have open adoptions.106
Studies of open adoptions of infants found that feelings about open
ness were positive and that many adoptions were moving toward
99. For example, per one adoptive mother: “‘For his 17th birthday they all came.
That is, his birthmother, his two half-sisters, her current boyfriend.’ Another reported,
‘I have contact with all my kids’ birthparents. All of their birthfamilies are very much a
part of their lives and our lives in one way or another.’” Wright et al., supra note 97, at
50.
100. Deborah H. Siegel, Open Adoption of Infants: Adoptive Parents’ Feelings
Seven Years Later, 48 SOC. WORK 409, 415 (2003).
101. SMITH & LOGAN, supra note 34, at 121; Wright et al., supra note 97, at 47-48.
102. SMITH & LOGAN, supra note 34, at 116; Wright et al., supra note 97, at 47-48.
103. Siegel, supra note 100, at 413-14.
104. Frasch et al., supra note 23, at 441.
105. Id. (sixty-eight percent of adoptive parents in in-person open adoptions felt
positively about biological parents); Siegel, supra note 100, at 415 (noting overall satisfaction and direction toward more openness).
106. Frasch et al., supra note 23, at 438, 441.

R

R
R
R
R
R
R

\\server05\productn\W\WNE\32-1\WNE101.txt

20

unknown

Seq: 20

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

10-MAY-10

14:21

[Vol. 32:1

greater openness.107 Increases in contact were motivated by con
cern for the child’s well-being, better communication, and good re
lationships between the birth and adoptive parents.108 In fact,
studies suggest that the more contact families had with each other,
the more advantages and fewer disadvantages they attributed to the
contact.109 Adoptive parents were also willing to increase courtordered or agreed contact at the request of the birth family.110
Studies reveal that mediated adoptions tended to become fully
disclosed, particularly when the adopted adolescents or the adop
tive mothers initiated the increase.111 It is less likely for mediated
contact adoptions to become closed, but it does occur.112 Research
ers noted that decreases in contact were often caused by communi
cations gaps that led to misunderstandings regarding the motives
and intentions of the triad members.113
In addition, as the adoptee enters adolescence, studies show
that they gain authority regarding contact. In other words, as chil
dren age, the adults look to the adoptee to set the terms and pace
and are less and less involved with the actual contact.114 By the
time adoptees are adolescents, they are better able to manage the
complications of the birth-parent relationship. As one adoptive
mother noted, “I used to ‘vet’ the letters as some are quite strange,
but now that she is older she has them direct.”115 Similarly, another
mother said, “Last time . . . she went by herself to her mother’s flat,
but this was less successful as they found they did not communicate
well without my help.”116 At some point, there is a transition that
installs the adolescent adoptee as the driver of the amount and type
of contact, something both the adoptive and birth parents seem to
107. Dunbar et al., supra note 96, at 454, 462; Siegel, supra note 100, 415-16.
108. Dunbar et al., supra note 96, at 451.
109. Ryburn, supra note 97, at 634-35.
110. SMITH & LOGAN, supra note 34, at 121.
111. Dunbar et al., supra note 96, at 454; Siegel, supra note 100, at 414.
112. See Dunbar et al., supra note 96, at 451. When adoptive parents felt pressured to enter into an open adoption as a condition of receiving a baby, birth parents
initiated the decreases. Id.
113. Id. at 461. Dunbar et al. summed it up: “It was both striking and poignant
that network members may become distanced from one another because of inaccurate
perceptions about each other’s intentions regarding contact.” Id. These misperceptions
were most likely in mediated adoptions. Id.
114. Id. at 459-60.
115. Ryburn, supra note 97, at 633.
116. Id. at 632.
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understand and accept.117 This transfer of authority appears to
work well as long as the adolescent knows that he or she is in con
trol of, and has the information needed to effect, the contact.118
B. The Adoptive Parents
The level of openness did not appear to affect parental satisfac
tion with adoption or the closeness of their connection with the
adoptee.119 No matter how the openness came to be—through
court order or agreement—the adoptive parents viewed the contact
as beneficial. In one study, sixty-seven percent of the adopters felt
satisfied and comfortable with the contact.120 Several parents felt
discomfort but felt overall that contact was good, positive, and ben
eficial to the children.121 Those adoptive parents who had ongoing
contact tended to be more sympathetic and less negative toward
their children’s birth parents while those without contact had more
negative views.122 Adoptive parents also noted that the contact
helped them become closer to their children because they could
better understand their children and also speak knowledgably with
them about their birth families.123
Moreover, adoptive parents understood that their children had
connections to their pre-adoptive kin and helped them remain in
contact with birth parents, siblings, and grandparents.124 Those
who adopted adolescents “believed that adopting an adolescent
meant also adopting his or her family, including birthparents, sib
lings, and extended family.”125 Adoptive parents were active in
helping children maintain contact with siblings adopted into other
homes.126 In one study, adoptive parents wanted more contact for
117. See Dunbar et al., supra note 96, at 459-60 (quoting birth and adoptive parents sharing their views of the adoptee’s role in contact and the purpose of that
contact).
118. See id. at 460 (describing adoptive parents who had not shared sufficient
information with the adoptee to allow him or her to make the transition, including facts
such as contact information or that the birth parent actually was interested in contact
with the adoptee).
119. Frasch et al., supra note 23, at 440.
120. SMITH & LOGAN, supra note 34, at 98-99.
121. Id.; Ryburn, supra note 97, at 644.
122. Ryburn, supra note 97, at 639.
123. SMITH & LOGAN, supra note 34, at 93.
124. Id. at 87-89; Ryburn, supra note 97, at 631-32.
125. Wright et al., supra note 97, at 46.
126. SMITH & LOGAN, supra note 34, at 92, 96-97; Ryburn, supra note 97, at 633.
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their adolescent children or thought the amount of contact should
be up to the children.127
Studies regarding court-ordered open adoptions illustrate that
control is perhaps the most fundamental aspect of parenting for the
adoptive parents. In other words, it is not the exclusivity of
parenthood but, instead, “the phenomenology of parenthood [that]
is intrinsically characterised by a sense of ownership and con
trol.”128 Thus, the vast majority of the adopters in one study were
opposed to court-ordered contact, even when they recognized the
benefits of it.129 On the other hand, in another study of courtordered contact, adoptive parents indicated that their views about
contact were most negative at the beginning but had tempered over
time, so they believed that an initial decision against contact should
not be irrevocable.130
C. The Adoptees
Most of the studies are of the adults and not the adoptees, so
there is less to say about their views directly, but the studies that do
engage youth suggest that adoptees are interested in their birth
families and that, especially as they age, they are interested in con
tact.131 Researchers Smith and Logan summed up the complicated
feelings adopted children have about their adoptive and birth kin:
Children’s accounts of their feelings about adoption and
contact suggest that, for most of them, their everyday lives were
not clouded by a significant sense of loss. However, when we
asked them if they ever worried about anything[,] thirty-six (61
per cent) children identified issues associated with adoption or
their birth families. . . . Direct contact went some way towards
quelling these worries for many children and adoptive parents
were aware of its importance in this respect.132

Most children in one study were happy about being adopted
and happy with the post-adoption contact.133 Even children who
were happy with their adoption “expressed distress or ambivalence
about the decision to place them for adoption and the loss of their
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
1016.
132.
133.

Grotevant et al., supra note 14, at 92-93.
SMITH & LOGAN, supra note 34, at 105.
Id.
Ryburn, supra note 97, at 638.
See BENSON ET AL., supra note 11, at 26-27; Berge et al., supra note 96, at

R
R

SMITH & LOGAN, supra note 34, at 144.
Id. at 133, 140-41, 148-50.
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birth families.”134 Indeed, children’s own statements suggest that
they wanted to be both with their birth parents and with their adop
tive parents.135 A majority of the children who had direct contact
with their birth relatives wanted more frequent contact;136 a major
ity also felt transitory feelings of distress at the end of visits.137 A
minority of the children were distressed by contact with their par
ents, but some felt more comfortable regarding contact with siblings
or other relatives.138
Studies illustrate that adoptees in their adolescent years have a
strong interest in their birth parents, even when they are not in con
tact.139 Studies also indicate that the adoptees are happier when
they have direct contact with their birth parents.140 In one study,
adolescents with direct contact described the role of their birth
mothers in their lives most frequently as “a close or special friend,”
less frequently, as an “acquaintance or casual friend,” or “a rela
tive,” “another parent,” or “a birth mother.”141 Just under ten per
cent of the adolescent adoptees in that study described their mother
as having “no role” in their lives.142 Adoptees who were not in con
tact viewed the in-contact birth parents of their adoptive siblings as
surrogates for their own birth parents.143 Some children adopted as
adolescents refused to consent to their adoption if it meant they
would not be able to continue to see their siblings and other
relatives.144
D. The Birth Family
The birth parents have the least control in these relationships,
particularly those that are not regulated (i.e., enforceable). Unlike
adoptive parents who might prefer for contact not to be court or
dered, birth parents and birth relatives were more likely to want
134. Id. at 134.
135. Id. at 136-37.
136. Id. at 144; see also Grotevant et al., supra note 14, at 93.
137. SMITH & LOGAN, supra note 34, at 144.
138. Id. at 140-41.
139. See id. at 144; Berge et al., supra note 96, at 1029-31; Grotevant et al., supra
note 14, at 92.
140. Tai J. Mendenhall et al., Adolescents’ Satisfaction with Contact in Adoption,
21 CHILD & ADOLESCENT SOC. WORK J. 175, 186-88 (2004).
141. Grotevant et al., supra note 14, at 88.
142. Id.
143. Jerica M. Berge et al., Adolescent Sibling Narratives Regarding Contact in
Adoption, 9(2/3) ADOPTION Q. 81, 89-95 (2006).
144. Wright et al., supra note 97, at 52.
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court orders to protect their rights to visit.145 It is not surprising
then that they felt as if they had less control over the relationship
and felt less satisfied with the contact.146 At the same time, the
contact helped them to accept the adoptions after seeing their chil
dren “happy and well settled.”147 This contact helped the birth par
ents to accept adoptions that they had earlier contested.148
In addition, the adoptive family becomes the focal point of
connection between families such that birth parents experienced
the adoptive parents to be more concerned about controlling the
boundaries of the adoptive family and less attentive to birth-family
boundaries.149 In any event, birth parents do seem to feel a part of
the adoptive family as indicated by their interaction with their birth
children’s siblings150 and their feeling of “a familial connection with
their biological child’s adoptive family.”151 One birth mother
claimed of the family that adopted her child: “I feel like they could
be relatives of mine.”152 Birth parents also brought other members
of their family into contact with the children they relinquished for
adoption.153
E. The New Blended Families of Adoption
This brief rehearsal of findings from social studies of open
adoption suggests that the adoptive family of the open-adoption era
is not the nuclear family of the mythic American family lore. Lead
ing adoption researchers Harold Grotevant and Ruth McRoy call
this the “adoption kinship network” and describe it as a network
with “the child at the center of a family system that includes his or
her adoptive parents, siblings, and extended family as well as his or
her birth parents, siblings, and extended family, whether the indi
viduals are known to one another or not.”154
In both foster care and private adoptions, the birth and adop
tive families come together around important rites of passage as
well as everyday events. The birth mother’s sister might even
145. SMITH & LOGAN, supra note 34, at 122.
146. Dunbar et al., supra note 96, at 458.
147. SMITH & LOGAN, supra note 34, at 117.
148. See id.
149. Dunbar et al., supra note 96, at 457-58.
150. See Berge et al., supra note 143, at 90-91 (illustrating how birth mothers
identify and treat their birth children’s adoptive siblings as kin).
151. Id. at 91.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 90.
154. Grotevant et al., supra note 14, at 81.

R
R
R
R
R

R

\\server05\productn\W\WNE\32-1\WNE101.txt

2010]

unknown

Seq: 25

10-MAY-10

CHILD-CENTERED ADOPTION

14:21

25

babysit while the adoptive mother is away.155 In short, open adop
tion is becoming normal and represents one type of family among
many others created through divorce and remarriage, kinship care,
and lesbian- and gay-headed families—which by definition have at
least one parent or gamete donor who is not part of the
household.156
As one researcher observed, “Birth and adoptive family rela
tionships in open adoptions are likely to be as complex and varied
as relationships among spouses, parents and children, siblings, and
other family members in different family arrangements.”157 She
suggests that professionals working with these families embrace
rather than reject these phenomena. At the same time, they should
not be too directive about a type or level of contact.158 Instead,
professionals should talk to the adopters about the uniqueness of
adoption, what the family needs and wants at the current time, and
what it might want in the future.159 The social worker’s role should
be to facilitate a process by which families can reach out to one
another and then help them develop plans and procedures to
achieve those objectives.160
Open-adoption researchers Smith and Logan, who recommend
and prefer voluntary rather than court-imposed contact,161 find that
even under court-ordered contact,
[a]dopters are less likely to find contact problematic when they
have been fully involved in discussions about the details and pur
pose of contact arrangements and where they do not feel com
pelled to accept contact as a condition of placement. This also
requires social workers to undertake thorough discussions with
birth relatives about their hopes and expectations for the
future.162

Along these lines, England and Wales, where most adoptions
are from foster care, passed a law in 2002 that requires post-adop
tion contact to be considered when planning for adoption and man
dates that agencies provide post-adoption support for the
155. Siegel, supra note 100, at 414.
156. See generally Appell, The Endurance of Biological Connection, supra note
95, at 302-15.
157. Siegel, supra note 100, at 417.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. SMITH & LOGAN, supra note 34, at 182.
162. Id. at 183.
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families.163 This policy decision represents the recognition that
post-adoption contact is valuable and that social service agencies
have a role in supporting the adoptive kin network. In the United
States, which has a diverse array of paths to and in adoption, regu
lating and supporting the adoptive kin network is a complicated but
worthy and timely endeavor.
CONCLUSION
There are clearly benefits to voluntary, but enforceable, adop
tion with contact and also—particularly in the case of foster-child
adoptions—court-imposed post-termination or post-adoption con
tact. As the British experience reveals, despite its disregard of fam
ily autonomy, court-ordered post-adoption contact at the time of
adoption does not undermine the adoptive parents’ legitimacy and
has overall positive outcomes. Massachusetts seems to have an op
timal regulatory scheme in that it provides for adoption with con
tact—post-adoption-contact agreements that are enforceable—and
for equitable court-imposed post-adoption contact in those in
stances where contact agreements are not feasible. Massachusetts
law also provides for termination of parental rights with contact, a
vehicle that helps protect important family relationships between
termination and adoption. Unfortunately, Adoption of Rico missed
an opportunity to examine those various options and instead fell
back on the equitable authority of the courts to order visits as if the
legislature had never intervened.
The courts are in a unique, and sometimes the best, position to
protect children’s legal rights and interests in foster care and adop
tion. The courts can do so directly or by authorizing the persons
closest to the child to protect those interests. The trial court in Rico
did neither while the Supreme Judicial Court surprisingly ruled that
the trial court was duty-bound to order post-adoption contact even
when there was no adoptive family before it. The court opined that
there was just one option: for the trial court to enter an order for a
future that was still unknown and unknowable. In so doing, the
court missed an opportunity to engage the people and agencies
working with Rico directly and to educate them about collaborative
planning in and for adoption.

163. Elsbeth Neil, Supporting Post-Adoption Contact for Children Adopted From
Care: A Study of Social Workers’ Attitudes, 10(3-4) ADOPTION Q. 3, 4-5 (2007).
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assent required. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.0427(1) (West 2005).
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Birth Parents
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petition for modification
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the parties
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adoptive parent’s
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unduly burdensome due
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Enforce
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required)

Standard for
Approval

unknown
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Birth parents
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1939; 1997

R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 15-7
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S.D.
CODIFIED
LAWS § 25-6
17

RI

SD
All children

All children

All children

All children

Which
Adoptees

Birth parents

Birth parents

Birth relatives with
emotional ties creating
ongoing personal
relationship with the
child; for children under 1
year, relationship must
have lasted at least half
the child’s life

Surrendering birth
parents, prospective
adoptive or adoptive
parent & siblings2

Who Can Have Contact

Birth & adoptive parents

Court, adoptive & birth
parents, GAL or placing
agency, child 12 & over

Court, birth, adoptive
parents, children 14 &
over

Court, birth & adoptive
parents

Whose Approval Needed

None

BIC

None

BIC

Standard for
Approval

Not stated

BIC

BIC, party seeking
modification has
attempted to mediate,
and either exceptional
circumstances or the
parties agree

BIC for enforcement but
enforcement but
enforcement presumed if
the agreement part of
surrender & incorporated
into tpr order3

Standard to Modify or
Enforce

2010]
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2. Note that in agency and foster care adoptions, the child welfare or adoption agency and the child’s law guardian (attorney) enter into the
agreement as well and may move to enforce the agreement. N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW §§ 383-c(2)(b), 384(2)(b) (McKinney Supp. 2010).
3. Not enforceable against a sibling 14 years old or older unless that sibling has consented to the agreement. Id. § 383-c(2)(b).
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VT. STAT.
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BIC
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either exceptional
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Standard to Modify or
Enforce
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